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ARGUMENT 
I. FLORIDA LAW DOES NOT APPLY 
A. The Parties Did Not Agree That Florida Law Would Apply 
Contrary to Broward County's assertion, the parties did not agree that Florida law 
would, to the exclusion of all other law, govern disputes arising out of the parties' 
contract. Indeed, the provision relied upon by Broward County does not even mention 
"Florida." This, despite the fact that parties intending to include a choice of law clause 
"will usually refer expressly to the state of the chosen law in their contract . . . ." 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a (1971) (emphasis added). It is of 
particular note that elsewhere, in the very same contract, "Florida" law is, with respect to 
certain issues, specifically designated as controlling. E.g., Record at 80, ^ 6 . 1 . Broward 
County drafted the contract and all provisions therein, including the purported choice of 
law provision. Record at 162, ^ 7-8. As the sole and exclusive drafter of the provision 
at issue, Broward County easily could have included appropriate language expressly 
providing for a choice of law provision, as it did elsewhere in the contract for other 
issues. Broward County's failure to do so precludes any assertion that the clause in 
dispute constitutes a valid and enforceable choice of law provision. See generally Zions 
First Nat. Bk. v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (holding that 
failure of drafting party to include appropriate language specifically spelling out the 
interpretation urged at court by drafting party mandated that provision's ambiguity be 
strictly construed against drafter). 
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B. Application of the Relevant Conflict of Law Rules Demonstrate that Utah 
Law., Not Florida Law, Governs 
The courts are charged with determining which substantive state law will govern in 
the absence of an effective choice of law provision. American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins., 
927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). In making this determination, the Utah courts have 
adopted the "most significant relationship" test as set forth in Section 188 of the Second 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Id. With respect to disputes arising out of contract, the 
relevant factors to be considered are: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of 
negotiation; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the 
contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties. IcL; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971). 
There is no apparent dispute between the parties regarding the factors that a court must 
consider.1 The actual application of those factors to this case is, however, hotly disputed. 
Contrary to Broward County's assertions, the relevant conflict of law rules 
demonstrate that Utah law, not Florida law, properly governs the parties' dispute. 
According to the Restatement, place of contracting is determined according to the place 
where the last act necessary to give the contract binding effect occurred. Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 cmt. e (1971). Trillium concedes that this last act 
1
 However, Broward County has failed to cite a single Utah case that has adopted or 
applied sections 191 or 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Nor has 
Trillium found such a case. Indeed, it appears that, under Utah law, "choice of law" is 
determined exclusively according to the test set forth in section 188 of the Restatement. 
See American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins., 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). 
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occurred in Florida upon defendant's acceptance of plaintiff s offer. However, as stated 
in the Restatement, "the place of contracting is a relatively insignificant contact." Id. 
The second factor, place of negotiation, is entirely neutral. Contrary to Broward County's 
assertion,2 there was no negotiation of any substance whatsoever. Broward County sent a 
pre-printed Invitation for Bid to Trillium, Trillium filled out the same and returned it to 
Broward County. Record at 162, ^  4-5. No further negotiation occurred. Record at 162, 
^ 6. The third factor, place of performance, again, contrary to Broward County's 
assertion,3 favors Trillium. Indeed, the vast majority of work performed by Trillium 
under the contract occurred outside of the boundaries of Florida, and more particularly in 
the state of Utah. Record at 162, |^ 10. The actual vehicle modification occurring in 
Florida comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the overall work contracted for by 
Trillium. Record at 163, J^ 10. Indeed, the actual installation of the conversion kits was 
simply the last, of many, responsibilities contracted for by Trillium. See id. The fourth 
factor, location of subject matter, also favors Trillium as the relevant inquiry is not where 
the goods in question ultimately ended up but rather where the goods originated. See 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter, 24 F.3d 125, 129 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(applying Utah rules regarding conflict of laws and holding that Texas law applied 
because the subject matter of the contract, a helicopter, originated in Texas). Most, if not 
2
 Response Brief of Appellee ("Response Brief) at 36. 
3
 id. 
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all, of the parts and components furnished to Broward County were gathered, assembled 
and shipped from outside of Florida. Record at 163, [^ 11. Finally, the last factor, 
location of the parties is entirely neutral.4 In sum, only place of contracting, a factor 
deemed by the Restatement as insignificant, favors Broward County. Accordingly, the 
choice of law factors weigh in favor of application of Utah law, not Florida law. 
II. BROWARD COUNTY CONCEDES THAT THE FLORIDA VENUE 
PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY 
Broward County now concedes that, regardless as to whether Utah or Florida 
substantive law applies, the Florida common law venue provision originally urged by it 
does not apply.5 See Response Brief at 36-37. Indeed, it must. Rules regarding venue 
are "wholly procedural." Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967). Under well established Utah law, even 
where the law of another state is deemed to be applicable and controlling, the procedural 
law of that state, including those provisions regarding the manner and method of bringing 
suit, is to be disregarded. Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 685 & n.3 (Utah 1981); Records 
v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 & n.14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Financial Bancorp v. Pingree 
4
 Broward County's overreaching is typified by its contention that this factor somehow 
overwhelmingly favors Broward County. Broward County is located in Florida, Trillium 
in Utah. How Broward County contends that "the relevant consideration" regarding 
cc[t]he domicil [sic], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 
the parties" (Response Brief at 36) is anything but neutral is mystifying at best. 
The purported applicability of the Florida common law venue rule was the exclusive 
basis for its Motion to Dismiss. Record at 20-22. 
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and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 & n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Accordingly, even were 
Florida substantive law applicable, the Florida procedural rule regarding venue would not 
apply. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO CONSIDER 
THOSE ISSUES RAISED BY BROWARD COUNTY FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN ITS REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Broward County argues that the trial court possessed the discretion to dismiss this 
action based upon those arguments that Broward County improperly raised for the first 
time by way of its Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
("Reply Memorandum"). (Response Brief at 28.) According to Broward County, the trial 
court's decision to dismiss the action is therefore reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. (Id.) Broward County is in error on both counts. Indeed, the two cases cited by 
Broward County are not on point. Further, Broward County ignores cases, including Utah 
decisions, that are on point and that demonstrate that a trial court may not properly 
consider arguments raised for the first time by way of a reply memorandum. 
Broward County cites the 1980 Utah Supreme Court decision, Romrell v. Zions 
First Naf 1 Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that a trial court, in 
its discretion, may consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply memorandum in 
determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted. (Response Brief at 28.) 
However, as Broward County itself candidly admits, the Court in Romrell was speaking 
exclusively about its own power to consider issues raised for the first time by way of a 
reply memorandum. (Id.) The Court did not consider whether a trial court could order a 
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case dismissed based upon issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply 
memorandum. See Romrell, 611 P.2d at 395. 
In contrast, more recent decisions, including decisions from within the Utah courts, 
have specifically addressed whether a trial court may properly consider issues raised for 
the first time by way of a reply memorandum in determining whether to grant a motion to 
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. These decisions demonstrate that a trial court 
does not have the judicial discretion to consider such issues. E.g., State v. 
Pathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); White v. Kent Medical 
Center, Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). In Pathammavong, the Utah Court 
of Appeals specifically determined that a trial court lacked the discretion to consider 
issues raised for the first time by way of a reply memorandum when considering whether 
a motion to dismiss should be granted. Id. at 1004 ("The Washington court held that the 
trial court improperly considered an issue first raised in movant's reply memorandum. 
We find the reasoning in White persuasive. Since defendant first raised the issue in his 
reply memorandum, it was not properly before the trial court. . . ."). Likewise, in White, 
a decision cited with approval in several Utah decisions, the Washington Court of 
Appeals determined that a trial court was precluded from considering issues raised for the 
first time in a reply memorandum in determining whether a motion for summary 
6
 The second case cited by Broward County, Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wash. 
1995), completely fails to support Broward County's assertion. In Boyd, the court 
determined that it, an appellate court, could consider issues raised in a reply brief because 
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judgment should be granted. 810 P.2d at 8-9. As these cases demonstrate, a trial court 
does not have the discretion to consider issues raised for the first time by way of a reply 
memorandum when considering a motion to dismiss. The authority cited by Broward 
County does not command a different conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court below 
lacked the discretion to consider those issues raised by Broward County for the first time 
in its Reply Memorandum. 
Broward County further seeks to defend the fact that it did not raise its arguments 
regarding applicability of Utah's venue statutes and comity until its Reply Memorandum 
by attempting to establish some sort of tenuous connection between those arguments and 
the arguments made by the parties in the two principal memoranda. (Response Brief at 
29.) However, the simple and unassailable fact is that neither party addressed the 
applicability of Utah's venue statutes nor principles of comity in any way whatsoever 
before Broward County filed its Reply Memorandum. In essence, Broward County 
contends that both the applicability of Utah venue statutes and principles of comity were 
somehow implicit or inherent in its original memorandum. However, as stated by the 
Washington Supreme Court, "[a] party responding to a . . . motion should not have to 
guess what additional issues may be 'inherent' in the motion." R.D. Merrill Co. v. 
Pollution Control Bd., 969 P.2d 458, 473 n.10 (Wash. 1999). 
a particular Washington rule of appellate procedure specifically and expressly granted the 
appellate court the discretion to consider such issues. IdL 
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Nor does the fact that Trillium sought leave from the trial court to submit a 
supplemental memorandum addressing those new arguments raised by Broward County 
serve to somehow excuse the fact that Broward County impermissibly raised new issues 
in its Reply Memorandum. Indeed, the record appears to demonstrates that the trial court 
never even read the Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New 
Arguments Raised by Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum") 
that Trillium attached to its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike. Record at 302, 
p. 5, 17-20. Accordingly, it can hardly be said, as Broward County contends, that 
"Trillium had—and capitalized on—a full and fair opportunity to address any and all 
relevant issues . . . ." (Response Brief at 31.) Further, it is unclear how incorporating 
portions of the Supplemental Memorandum into the Brief of the Appellant presented to 
this Court somehow serves to retroactively ensure that Trillium was afforded full due 
process as Broward County contends. (Response Brief at 31.) The simple fact of the 
matter is that Broward County improperly raised new issues in its Reply Memorandum in 
violation of established Utah law. To countenance such behavior would required this 
Court to overturn established precedent. The trial court did not have discretion to 
consider such issues and Trillium was unfairly denied the due process that it was entitled 
to when the court did so. 
IV. UTAH'S VENUE STATUTES DO NOT PRECLUDE BROWARD COUNTY 
FROM BEING SUED IN THE COURTS OF UTAH 
Despite Broward County's claim to the contrary, Utah's venue statutes do not 
prevent it from being sued in the courts of Utah. Indeed, the Utah venue statute relied 
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upon by Broward County has exclusive application to suits brought against Utah counties 
in the courts of Utah. It simply does not apply to actions brought against counties of 
other states. 
In interpreting a statute, a court's "primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 
177, 184 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, a court is "to look first to the statute's plain 
language." Id. A court need not look beyond the language of the statute unless there is 
some ambiguity in the statute. Id. "Statutory language is ambiguous if it can reasonably 
be understood to have more than one meaning." Id. Indeed, a statute is ambiguous where 
each party offers plausible statutory interpretations. Epperson v. Utah State Retirement 
BcL, 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("We have long held that 'ambiguous' 
means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings.'") (quoting Alf v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993)); Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Common, 
845 P.2d 266, 270 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that statute would be deemed 
ambiguous if both parties offered "plausible" interpretations). "Finally, 'one of the 
cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, 
spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject.'" Moreno v. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan School, 926 P.2d 
886, 889 (Utah 1996) (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 
466 (Utah 1989)). See also Evans, 963 P.2d at 184 ("[I]f we find a provision ambiguous, 
which causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the 
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act in its entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent 
and purpose/'7) (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 
(Utah 1993)); Derbridge v. Mutual Protective Ins, Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct App. 
1998) ("An ambiguous statute must be interpreted in a reasonable way, with an eye 
toward the construction that will achieve the best results in practical application [and] will 
avoid 'unacceptable consequences/ and will be 'consistent with sound public policy/") 
(internal citations omitted). 
Section 78-13-3 of the Utah Code provides: 
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county, 
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be 
commenced and tried in any county not a party thereto. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996). Broward County claims that section 78-13-3 applies 
not only to suits against Utah counties brought in the Utah courts, but to suits brought 
against non-Utah counties as well. (Response Brief at 26-27.) According to Broward 
County, section 78-13-3 strictly precludes a Florida county, such as itself, from being 
sued in the courts of Utah. (Id.) Broward County, however, failed to cite a single case in 
support of this assertion. 
Utah courts have not considered whether section 78-13-3 applies to non-Utah 
counties. However, courts of other jurisdictions have considered whether similar venue 
provisions apply to the municipal entities of non-forum states. In Hansford v. District of 
Columbia, suit was brought against the District of Columbia in the state courts of 
Maryland. 617 A.2d 1057 (Md. 1993). The District of Columbia moved to dismiss the 
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action on the grounds that, under Maryland rules relating to venue, municipal 
corporations could only be sued in the county in which they are situated. Id. at 1061. The 
District of Columbia argued that the Maryland venue statutes and rules applied not only to 
Maryland municipal corporations, but to all municipal corporations of all states. Id. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals (the highest court of Maryland) rejected the District of 
Columbia's argument, stating: 
[A] Maryland municipality, sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action, 
should be sued where it is situated. The District of Columbia is not a 
Maryland municipal corporation and is not situated in a Maryland county. 
In the context of this case, it is a nonresident corporate defendant. 
Adoption of the District's argument would lead to the adoption of a venue 
rule which would granl foreign municipal corporations the unique privilege 
of being immunized from suit in the State of Maryland. The Supreme Court 
of Kansas addressed this issue in Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221 
Kan. 369, 373, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977), stating: "there is no sound 
reason why a foreign municipal corporation should be treated any 
differently from foreign private corporations." We agree with the Supreme 
Court of Kansas and hold that a foreign municipal corporation is subject to 
the same venue rules as any private corporation. 
Id at 1061-62. 
Moreover, a review of other Utah statutes relating to counties, as contained in the 
Judicial Code (sections 78-1-1 through 78-57-110 of the Utah Code), makes it readily 
apparent that the Utah legislature did not intend for section 78-13-3 to apply to suits 
against non-Utah counties. For example, section 78-27-14 of the Utah Code provides that 
"[w]hen a county is a party and costs are awarded against it, they must be paid out of the 
county treasury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-14 (1996) (emphasis added). The Utah 
legislature did not include the "of this State" language that Broward County insists must 
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be included to limit a statute's application to Utah counties. (Response Brief at 27.) 
Indeed, as argued by Broward County, "the plain wording of the statute applies to ca 
county/ Broward County is ca county' within the plain language of the statute just as 
much as any county located in Utah." (Id.) Yet clearly, the Utah legislature could not 
possibly have meant for section 78-27-14 to apply to Broward County. A contrary 
interpretation would, of course, be simply absurd. The Utah legislature would be utterly 
devoid of the power to impose such a restriction upon Broward County. Yet, the 
language adopted by the Utah legislature in both sections 78-13-3 and 78-27-14, with 
respect to "county," is identical. Accordingly, even assuming, for purposes of argument, 
that section 78-13-3 is ambiguous and may, under a forced interpretation, be construed as 
applying to foreign counties, such an interpretation must be rejected by this Court as it 
would not comport with the clear intentions of the Utah legislature, as evidenced by the 
entire context of the Judicial Code. See, e.g., Evans, 963 P.2d at 184 ("[I]f we find a 
provision ambiguous, which causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application, 
we must analyze the act in its entirety and "harmonize its provisions in accordance with 
the legislative intent and purpose.'") (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, 
854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993)); Moreno v. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan School 926 P.2d 886, 
889 (Utah 1996) ("'one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the 
courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire 
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.5") (quoting Mountain 
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States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989)). A contrary 
interpretation would simply be out of harmony with the Judicial Code as a whole. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO 
DISMISS THE ACTION UNDER PRINCIPLES OF COMITY 
Contrary to Broward County's assertion, the trial court did not have judicial 
discretion to dismiss this action under principles of comity. Indeed, the Utah legislature 
has set forth, by statute, important public policies that have removed the issue from the 
realm of comity and judicial discretion. Further, as the trial court was stripped of its 
judicial discretion to dismiss the suit under principles of comity, the trial court's dismissal 
is not reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard but rather under a 
correction of error standard. 
"Comity is the principle that a court, for considerations of public policy, should 
defer to a court of another jurisdiction or to a coordinate branch of government and is a 
matter that calls for the exercise of judicial discretion." Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 
1142, 1146 (Utah 1991). However, as stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the Legislature 
can remove an "issue from the realm of comity and judicial discretion." Id. Indeed, a 
court is precluded from invoking comity when to do so would be contrary to established 
public policy as determined by the Legislature. IcL 
7
 Further, whether a county or other form of municipality may be properly subjected to 
suit outside of its home county and state is a question of jurisdiction, not venue. 
Annotation, Right to Lay Venue of Action Against Municipality in County Other than 
that in Which it is Situated, 93 A.L.R. 500, 509 (1934) ("the question whether a 
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The Utah Legislature has, by statutory enactment, set forth important public 
policies which preclude the extension of comity under the present circumstances. The 
Utah Legislature has, by statute, stated: 
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. 
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996) (emphasis added). This statement of public policy 
reflects the conscious and purposeful determination that a Utah citizen is entitled to bring 
an action against a non-resident defendant in the courts of Utah when such a suit would 
not offend the Constitution. Id Further, it is implicit in the statute that the availability of 
redress in the courts of the non-resident defendant's home state is not a sufficient 
substitute for the right to bring suit in the courts of the plaintiffs home state.8 Id; see 
also Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 300 (Del. 1998) (holding that Delaware 
municipality can be sued in a state other than that of its situs would appear to be one of 
jurisdiction rather than venue...."). 
In stark contrast to the important public policies inherent in the Utah long arm statute, 
venue provisions (such as the Florida provision at issue) which purport to limit where 
states or their subdivisions may be sued are enacted merely "to serve the administrative 
convenience of the state." Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of Houston, 404 
N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas venue provisions should be 
given effect under principles of comity). A state's interests in adherence to venue 
restrictions are even weaker where the cause of action arises out of a commercial 
transaction. Id, 404 N.E.2d at 731. 
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long arm statute ccwas intended to 'avoid the necessity of following a tortfeasor to his [or 
her] place of domicile in order to obtain redress for his [or her] tort/") (alterations in 
original) (internal citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that section 78-27-22 is an express 
declaration of important Utah public policy. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 
701 P.2d 1106, 1110, 1111 (Utah 1985) ("Consistent with that policy declaration 
[contained in section 78-27-22], this Court has held that the protection afforded by Utah 
courts must be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law." Further 
stating, "[t]he legislative mandate is clear.") (emphasis added). Indeed, the important 
public policies embodied in section 78-27-22 are of such paramount importance that the 
Utah Supreme Court has, on several occasions, decreed that the courts of Utah "must" 
exercise jurisdiction over all non-resident defendants to the outermost limits of the 
Constitution. Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, \ 7, 980 P.2d 204 ("We have held that 
the Utah long-arm statute "must be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process 
of law.'") (quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 
1985)); Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110 ("Consistent with that policy declaration [contained 
in section 78-27-22], this Court has held that the protection afforded by Utah courts must 
be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law."). 
The important public policies encompassed within section 78-27-22 preclude a 
trial court from refusing to exercise jurisdiction, that would otherwise be permissible 
under the Constitution, under principles of comity, when the suit is brought by a citizen of 
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Utah. Cf Kent County, 713 A.2d at 301 ("The Delaware Long-Arm Statute . . . reflects] 
a coherent and comprehensive public policy which prohibits a Delaware Court from 
recognizing, as a matter of comity, either the absolute or the limited sovereign immunity 
arguments that have been asserted. . . ."). As admitted by Broward County, there is no 
dispute as to the fact that it is properly subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of 
Utah. (Response Brief at 18.) Accordingly, section 78-27-22 commanded that the trial 
court exercise jurisdiction over Broward County and it erred as a matter of law when it 
dismissed Broward County under principles of comity. 
A different conclusion is not mandated by the Utah Court of Appeals opinion in 
Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). To 
the contrary, even a cursory review of the decision in Jackett reveals the fallacy of 
Broward County's reliance. In Jackett, the trial court, under principles of comity, 
determined that a California statute of limitations would apply and dismissed the action. 
Id. at 1075.9 However, the salient facts were quite different from those present here. In 
Jackett, the court found that the plaintiff, a California resident, brought the action in 
Utah, solely in an attempt to escape the fact that the California statute of limitations had 
expired. Id. at 1077. Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision upholding the trial 
court's dismissal was based entirely upon the fact that the plaintiff was a California 
9
 Of particular note, is the fact that the court did not refuse to exercise jurisdiction over 
the California entity, it merely held that the action should be dismissed for the plaintiffs 
failure to adhere to the California statute of limitations. 
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resident,10 the plaintiff was blatantly engaged in forum shopping,11 and Utah public policy 
would not be offended by dismissal. 
None of the grounds relied upon by the court in Jackett are present here.13 Most 
important of all, is that fact that, unlike in Jackett, Trillium is a Utah citizen. Record at 2, 
% 1. As noted above, the Utah Legislature has precluded the Utah courts from refusing, 
under principles of comity, to exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought by a Utah citizen 
against a non-resident defendant. Indeed, as noted above, to so refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction would offend the clear public policies of the state of Utah. The Jackett court 
itself, recognized that comity can not be extended if the public policies of the forum state 
would be contravened. Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076 ("Of primary importance is whether the 
public policies of the forum state would be contravened if comity were extended."). 
10
 "Utah has little interest in litigating this dispute. Mr. Jackett is a California resident 
and L.A. Water is a California governmental entity. The fortuitous occurrence of the 
crash in Utah is not a compelling reason to accept jurisdiction/' Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of 
Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
11
 "Finally, extending comity in this case prevents forum shopping. Soon after Mr. 
Jackett was injured he filed a timely notice of claim as required by California's 
Governmental Claims Act. It was only after Mr. Jackett missed California's two-year 
statute of limitations, and thus, was foreclosed from suing in California that he filed his 
claim in Utah. Allowing Mr. Jackett to pursue his claim in our courts would open the 
door to other tardy out-of-state plaintiffs searching for a more favorable forum." Id. 
"Thus, the court was applying a statute of limitations consonant with Utah public 
policy; such a statute would be applied to Utah governmental entities sued in Utah as well 
as California entities sued in California." Id. 
"There's no forum shopping here." (Record at 302, p. 21.) It certainly can not be said 
that a plaintiff is engaged in forum shopping merely because it desires to bring the action 
in the courts of the state in which it resides and pays taxes. 
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The trial court below did not have judicial discretion to dismiss this action under 
principles of comity. The authority cited by Broward County does not mandate 
otherwise.14 Accordingly, the trial court's decision to dismiss the action was in error and 
should be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Order of Dismissal should be reversed. This Court should rule 
that Broward County is properly amenable to suit in the courts of Utah. This Court 
should remand the action for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. 
DATED this IH day of August, 2000. 
r 
ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN 
SHANE D. HILLMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
14
 Further, contrary to Broward County's insinuation, the majority of jurisdictions do not 
hold that the municipal corporations of other states are immune from suit outside of their 
state boundaries. E.g., Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md. 
1993) ("We agree with the majority of jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a 
municipal corporation is exempt from the venue principles governing other 
corporations."). See also Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Kan. 
1977) ("We have concluded that the rule which establishes a special privilege in favor of 
foreign municipal corporations so as to exempt them from suit in the court of Kansas is 
not in harmony with modern conditions nor does it meet the demands of justice in our 
present society."). 
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